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Equity Holders' Liability for Limited
Liability Companies' Unrecoverable
Debts -Reflections on Piercing the

Corporate Veil Under German Law
BERND SINGHOF*

I. INTRODUCTION

In many countries, the notion of "piercing the corporate
veil" 1 (Durchgriffshaftung) is a recognized concept of corporate
law. Yet, from a doctrinal point of view, the concept is
underdeveloped and "exceedingly murky." 2
The notion of
piercing varies considerably among foreign jurisdictions. 3 The
* J.S.D., Johannes Gutenberg University (1997); LL.M., Cornell University (1997);
J.D., Johannes Gutenberg University (1993). Managing research associate at the Center
for German and International Law of Financial Services, Johannes Gutenberg University
of Mainz.
The Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review was unable
to obtain English translations for certain German source material cited in this Article.
Accordingly, the Review relies on the author's representations as to the accuracy of these
sources.
1. DANIEL ZIMMER, INTERNATIONALES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 332-333 (1996).
2. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 140 (6th ed. 1996).

3. In the United States, veil-piercing jurisprudence is among the most frequently
litigated issues; by comparison, the volume of litigation is considerably lower in Germany
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sweeping language of a few vague court decisions causes confusion
in this area of law and is the subject of numerous contradicting
articles. Notwithstanding some striking similarities, the respective
national jurisdiction preoccupies the ongoing discussions. Given
the increasing number of cross-border business transactions and
corporations doing business in foreign jurisdictions, it seems
helpful to acknowledge legal solutions other legal systems offer.
This approach may help lawyers *ecognize foreign corporate
alternatives and induce lawyers to think about how to shape or
4
amend their (national) concept.
Generally, "piercing the corporate veil" refers to the direct,5
personal liability of one or more of a company's shareholders.
These shareholders may be held liable beyond their initial
investments in the company. 6 Such liability arises when deference
to the company's legal personality is deemed to contravene the
principles of good faith and justice. 7 Some examples of situations
giving rise to shareholders' personal liability involve commingling
of private and company funds and gross undercapitalization of the
company. 8 However self-explanatory this preliminary description
sounds, it is rather insufficient and contains shortcomings. First,
"piercing," if overly applied, disregards the corporate form and
might undermine the concept of the legal corporate entity.
Second, the determinative test for personal shareholder liability is
somewhat unclear. Third, there is a dispute over the legal
consequences of piercing the corporate veil, i.e., whether it triggers
liability to the direct benefit of the corporation's creditors or
installs internal liability to the corporation's benefit.
As indicated, piercing the corporate veil is a general
corporate problem. Yet, a closer look at German case material
indicates that the problem mainly arises in close member-managed
companies where shareholders are not separated from control, but
rather, exert undue influence on the corporation. Not surprisingly,
and U.K. See Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies
in the European Community and in the U.S.: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German,and
U.K. Veil-piercingApproaches, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 77 (1998).

4. In Europe, there is remarkable initiative to create a supranational "European
Private Company." See Peter Hommelhoff & Dietmar Helms, Weiter auf dem Weg zur
EuropaischenPrivatgesellschaft,90 GMBH-RUNDSCHAU [GMBHR] 53, 53 (1999).
5. See KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140.

6. See id. at 140-142.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140.
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piercing the corporate veil was initially introduced in the context
of limited liability companies that have only one equity holder. 9 In
those wholly owned companies, there is almost no separation
between management, equity holders, and those bearing the risk. 10
Consequently, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in
Germany focuses on the limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung), as governed by the Limited Liability
Company Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit
beschrankter Haftung (GmbHG)). nl Accordingly, this Article
exclusively analyzes German law pertaining to limited liability

companies.
II. THE UNDERLYING CORPORATE PRINCIPLES
A. Legal Entity and Separationof Funds
Generally, a corporation is considered a legal entity distinct
from its members, to which rights and duties attach. 12 With
respect to limited liability, the concept of a separate legal
personality (JuristischePerson).is set forth in GmbHG section 13,

9. See HEINZ ROWEDDER, GMBHG § 13 cmt. 24 (Heinz Rowedder ed., 3d ed.
1997).
10. A striking feature in this respect warrants highlighting: the equity holders'
meeting is a company's supreme decision-making body. GmbHG section 45 provides that
the equity holders' rights, in relation to the company's affairs and especially with regard to
management of the business, and how these rights are exercised, are set forth in the
articles of association (Gesellschaftsvertrag), unless statutory provisions provide otherwise.
Generally, this leaves remarkable leeway to the equity holders' meeting (e.g., it may give
directions to the managing directors and may lead to full managing competence through
the equity holders' meeting). In a nutshell, the law permits the members of a limited
liability corporation to enter into any agreement they desire to govern internal relations
limited only by certain broad public policy restrictions.
11. See Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbHG), v.
20.4.1892 (RGBI. S. 477), amended by GmbHG, v. 22.6.1998 (BGBI. I S. 1474) (F.R.G.).
The vast majority of companies in Germany are organized in the form of limited liability
companies. See Heribert Hirte, The European Private Company, A German Perspective,
in THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMPANY 95, 96 (Harm-Jan De Kluiver & Walter Van
Gerven eds., 1995). In 1991, there were about 465,650 limited liability companies as
opposed to 3,500 stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaften), of which only about 650 were
listed on the stock exchange by 1995. See id. at 95. Since the introduction of the Small
Stock Corporation Act (Gesetz fur kleine Aktiengesellschaften und zur Deregulierung des
Aktienrechts, v. 2.8.1994 (BGB1. I S. 1961) (F.R.G.)), however, taking the form of a stock
corporation with equity financing at capital markets, in this author's opinion, seems to
have become more and more attractive to small and medium-sized German businesses.
12. See SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG-GESETZ § 13 cmt. 2 (Volker Emmerich
ed., 9th ed. 2000) [hereinafter SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG].
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which states: "The company with limited liability as such has its
independent rights and duties; it may acquire title and other real
13
property rights and may sue and be sued before the courts."
Thus, it is the company that both incurs debts and acquires rights.
The company essentially acts through its statutorily authorized
agents 14 ("members" in a member-managed limited liability
company and "managers" in a manager-managed limited liability
company15 ).
In addition, the company itself is the only party liable to
creditors. Once a limited liability company legally registers in the
commercial register, no equity holder, simply by virtue of being a
member, is personally liable for the company's debts and
obligations. This is not, as it may seem, a natural "'corollary' ... of

the concept of the corporation as an entity."'16 Rather, it is based
17
on a self-standing decision of the corporate legislation's drafters.
GmbHG section 1318 provides that "only the company's assets are
available to satisfy the claims of the company's creditors. ."19 and
thus circumscribes the fundamental principle of corporate
separateness (Trennungsprinzip)-separation of the company's
20
and the equity holders' assets.
B. ParallelConcepts of CorporateFinance
In general, limited liability offers the advantage of allowing
members to participate in the control of the business without
risking their personal assets beyond their initial investments in the
company. This would be legally unacceptable in absence of at
least some creditor protection laws. Limited liability shifts some of
the risks of business failure to creditors and company employees.
Thus, these individuals have vital interests in the legal protection
of the company and in its capital.

13. § 13 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G).
14. See § 35 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
15.

See KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT § 36.11.2 (3d ed. 1997).

16. KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 139.
17.

See SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG, supra note 12, § 13 cmt. 55 (Volker

Emmerich ed.). See also Karlheinz Boujong, Das Trennungsprinzip des § 13, Abs. 2
GmbHG und seine Grenzen in der neuen Judikatur des Bundesgerichtshofes, in
FESTSCHRIFT ODERSKY 739, 739 (1996).
18. § 13 Abs. 2 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
19. Id.
20. See Marcus Lutter, Haftungsfragenin der Holding, in HOLDING-HANDBUCH 248,
252, cmt. F 10 (Marcus Lutter ed., 3d ed. 1998).
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The Limited Liability Company Act provides statutory rules
governing the protection of stated corporate
capital
21
(Haftungskapital).
Compliance with these rules is the
indispensable price equity holders pay in exchange for the shelter
corporate limited liability provides. 22 As the rules become more
elaborate, some last resort protections, which hold equity holders
personally liable, become narrower in scope. Accordingly, prior to
commencing discussion of piercing the corporate veil, one must
address the concept of corporate finance.
In Germany, strict mandatory rules securing the legal entity's
capitalization support the corporate principles described above. In
general, corporate law requires that corporations remain furnished
with an amount of contributed legal capital (Stammkapital)23 to
protect creditors. 24 Equity holders only "deserve" limited liability
if they contribute cash or any form of tangible or intangible
property or benefit in a verifiable manner, and do not extract
those contributions at 26
a later time.25 No equity holder is exempt
from these obligations.
Based hereon, German corporate law provides a complicated
set of special preventive rules to secure legal capital, not only at
the time of formation, 27 but also throughout the duration of the

21.
22.

See §§ 5,7 Abs. 2-3, 9, 9c, 19-25,30,31 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
See § 13 Abs. 2 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
See also Karsten

Schmidt, Zur

Durchgriffsfestigkeit der GmbH, 15 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRSTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 837,

838 (1994).
23.

See § 30 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).

24. See § 5 GmbHG (F.R.G.). The concept of legal capital does not require that the
company post a bond equal to the stated amount or hold sufficient funds in the corporate
treasury and invest them in risk-free assets-legal capital is nothing more than an item on
the liabilities side of the balance sheet. See § 42 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.); § 266 Abs.
3.A.I. HGB (F.R.G.). But see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 60 (1991) (proffering that, in order for

capitalization "requirements to be effective, the corporation must post a bond equal to its
highest expected liability or hold sufficient funds in the corporate treasury and invest them
in risk-free assets."). For a critical analysis of the legal capital concept, from an Italian
perspective, see Marco Saverio Spolidoro, The Legal Capital and the Raising of Funds
Through Issuance of Securities in Italy, 43 AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 363 (1998).
25. See SCHMIDT, supra, note 15, § 13.1.2.

26. See § 19 Abs. 2 GmbHG (F.R.G.).

See also SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM

GMBHG, supra note 12, § 19 (Uwe H. Schneider ed.).

27. See, e.g., §§ 5, 7, Abs. 2-3, 9-9c, 19-25 GmbHG (F.R.G.) (the accumulation of
capital (Grundsatz der Kapitalaufbringung)).
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corporation's existence. 2 8 The following sections describe some of
these significant rules.
1. Risk of Liability for Members: Creditor Protection and Orderly
Financing of the Company
a. Equity holders' liabilityfor a capitalshortfall after the
formation (Unterbilanzhaftung nach Griindung)
A limited liability company must register with the commercial
register to be deemed full-fledged. 2 9 Due to the strain on the
Registration Courts, a significant period of time, usually between
three and six months, passes between the closing of the notarized
corporate contract, the concurrent filing with the commercial
30
register, and the company's entry in the commercial register.
Today, it is well recognized that the company "to be formed," i.e.,
the pre-incorporated company (Vor-Gesellschaft), is a business
organization sui generis (Organisationsui generis)3 1 that may enter
into transactions and assume liabilities. 32 Thus, many companies
enter into contracts prior to formation. Given these commercial
activities during the pre-incorporation period, at the time of the
company's formation (i.e., its registration), its assets and liabilities
may result in a negative balance that no longer equals the stated
capital. In this case, all equity holders are personally liable to the
corporation
for the difference
on the balance sheet
33
(Unterbilanzhaftung).
Each equity holder's individual share
depends on his or her capital participation. If one equity holder is
34
unable to pay, the others assume his or her liability.

28. See §§ 30-31 GmbHG (F.R.G.) (the maintenance of capital (Grundsatz der
Kapitalerhaltung)).
29. See § 11 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
30. See Marcus Lutter, Haftungsrisiken bei der Grundung einer GmbH, 38
JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 1073, 1073 (1998).
31. See MARCUS LUTTER & PETER HOMMELHOFF, GMBHG § 11 cmt. 2 (15th ed.

2000). "Sui generis" means "of its own kind or class; peculiar."
DICTIONARY 1436 (6thed. 1990).
32. See LUTTER & HOMMELHOFF, supra note 31, § 11 cmt. 2.
33. See Lutter, supra note 30, at 1075.
34. See § 24 GmbHG (F.R.G.).

BLACK'S LAW
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b. Equity holder's liabilityfor the unincorporatedcompany's loss
(Verlustdeckungspflicht)
If, however, the registration is rejected, the unincorporated
company will be liquidated. 35 In this case, a duty arises to cover
any remaining debts after liquidation of the corporate assets
(Verlustdeckungspflicht),36 which supplements the obligations
described above. This liability is the subject of long-standing
debate over whether liability is limited, unlimited, internal, or
external. 37 Only recently, the German Supreme Court concluded
that equity holders' liability, in general, is unlimited but strictly
internal. 38 Consequently, the corresponding claims belong to the
unincorporated company, 39 which must use incoming payments to
satisfy third party liabilities. 40 This concept seems convincing for a
number of reasons. First, only unlimited liability protection
prevents members facing "high losses" from taking actions that
could lead to the incorporation's failure. Second, internal liability
stands for harmonization of the corporate assets and the balance
41
sheet.

35. See SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG, supra note 12, § 11 cmt. 55 (Karsten
Schmidt ed.).
36. See Walter Stimpel, Unbeschrankte oder beschrankte, Auflen-oder innenhaftung
der Gesellschafter der Vor-GmbH, in FESTSCHRIFT FLECK 345, 363 (1988).
37. See Lutter, supra note 30, at 1077.
38. See BGH [Supreme Court], Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 50 (1997),
1507 (1507) (F.R.G.); Detlef Kleindiek, Zur Griinderhaftung in der Vor-GmbHBesprechung der Entscheidung BGH ZIP 1997, 679, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 427 (1997).

But see Holger

Altmeppen, Das unvermeidliche Scheitern des Innenhaftungskonzeptes in der Vor-GmbH,
50 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3272 (1997);

SCHMIDT, supra note 15, §

34.III.3.c.
39. See BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 50 (1997), at 1508. But see LG
Heidelberg [trial court], Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 18 (1997), 2045 (2048)
(considering the merits of a piercing-like liability for equity holders at this stage, the court
noted that external liability seems reasonable in cases where the corporation has virtually
no assets, no manager, and insolvency proceedings most likely will not commence).
40. See BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 50 (1997), at 1509.
41. See Lutter, supra note 30, at 1077.
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c. The de facto manager'sliability priorto formation
(Handelndenhaftung im Grtindungsstadium)
At the pre-incorporation stage, creditors need additional
protection because there is no limited liability company in effect
when contracts with third parties are signed.42 The company has
not yet taken the final step in the incorporation process, and the
court has not yet audited the company to determine whether it is
duly established with adequate stated capital. 43 Therefore,
anybody (with or without an equity stake in the company) who
acts as a "de facto manager" and enters into contracts on the
future company's behalf is arguably liable thereunder. 44 A
counter-party can look to these individuals, acting as a group, and
hold
each
individual
jointly
and
severally
liable
45
(Handelndenhaftung). Joint and several liability is triggered, not
only when the corporation fails to pay or perform a contract or
when it slides into insolvency prior to formation, but it also exists
simultaneously with the future company's liability. 46 The liability
of these individuals
so acting ceases to exist upon the company's
47
registration.
d. Contributionsin kind (Sacheinlagen)
Yet another problem is what lawyers in the United States
pictorially describe as "watering the stock. ' 48 "Water" is "present
in a corporation when it issues shares for overvalued assets and
uses the inflated value for its book entries." 49 Consequently, one

42.
43.

See § 11 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
See §9(c) GmbHG (F.R.G.).

44. See BGHZ 66, 359 (360) (F.R.G.). The external liability of de facto managers
must be clearly distinguished from the general internal liability of promoters. To wit, the
courts have narrowed the scope of external liability to managers and de facto managers of
the to-be-formed company who were involved in the business transaction at hand, or who
knew of and consented to the transaction (enger Handelndenbegriffl. See id.
45. See § 11 Abs. 2 GmbHG (F.R.G.). See also Council Directive 68/151, art. 7,1968
O.J. (L 65) 8-12.
46. See GONTER H. ROTH & HOLGER ALTMEPPEN, GmbHG, § 11 cmt. 26 (3d ed.

1997).
47. See BGHZ 69, 95 (103) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 70, 132 (139) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 80, 129
(145) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 80, 182 (185) (F.R.G.).
48. KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 211.
49. Id. See SCHOLTZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG, supra note 12, § 5 cmt. 37 (Heinz

Winter ed.) (defining "contributions in kind" as any non-cash assets shareholders
contribute to the company's legal capital).
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of corporate law's primary objectives is verifying that the value of
the contributions in kind (Sacheinlagen) equals the par value of
the shares. 50 Any shortfalls must be compensated for in cash. 5 1 In
order to circumvent these strict rules, contributions in cash are
often combined with seemingly unrelated business transactions
between the corporation and the equity holders in a complicated
manner. 52
Only after diligent investigation is the whole
transaction unmasked as a "disguised contribution in kind"
(verdeckte oder verschleierte Sacheinlage).53 In this case, the
equity holder is not discharged of his or her obligation, but must
make another contribution in cash in return for his or her
54
contribution in kind.
e. Repayments to equity holders (Rtickzahlungen)
The GmbHG contains a number of provisions aimed at
maintaining the legal equity capital. 55 For purposes of this Article,
it suffices to indicate that the company is barred from making any
repayment of equity contributions to the equity holders that
reduces the company's net assets to below the legal capital
requirements. 56
This also applies to benefits the company
provides for inadequate consideration of the equity holder
57 It
(verdeckte Einlagenriickgewhr).
is important to note that
these restrictions are designed to protect the company's stated
capital only. 58 Therefore, repayment to equity holders of capital
surplus exceeding the stated amount of equity capital seems fully
permissible from a corporate perspective. This is evident despite
the fact that, as discussed in detail below, such payment might

50. See § 5 Abs. 4 GmbHG (F.R.G.); § 8 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 GmbHG (F.R.G.); § 9 Abs. 1
GmbHG (F.R.G.); see also § 7 Abs. 3 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
51. See § 9 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
52.

See LUTTER & HOMMELHOFF, supra note 31, § 5 cmt. 35.

53. For a full discussion of critical remarks with respect to European Law, see id. See
also Lutter, supra note 30, at 1078 (examining Council Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L26) 113).
54. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 37.II.4.b (criticizing the legal consequences).
55. See, e.g., § 30 Abs. 1, § 33 Abs. 2, § 34 Abs. 3 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
56. See § 30 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.). Payments contrary to GmbHG section 30
must be reimbursed to the company. See id. Equity holders, other than the recipient,
must assume this liability only if the recipient is unable to pay. See § 31 Abs. 3 GmbHG
(F.R.G.). See BGH, Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 20 (1999), 1352 (1353-1354).
57. See ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 30 cmt. 43.

58. See § 30 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
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impair the company's financial situation (i.e., its59liquidity) and
subject company managers to criminal prosecution.
f

"Capital-replacing"loans (kapitalersetzende Darlehen)
"[W]hen a small business finds itself in financial difficulty, the
equity owners very often will feel compelled to add additional
funds to keep it going." 60 Under certain circumstances, however,
61
equity owners are not free to shift from equity to debt financing.
A fairly complicated body of statutory and case law governs equity
holders' responsibility when they equity-finance the company. If
an equity holder extends loans to the company, rather than
investing in the firm in the form of equity when a "prudent" equity
holder would have done so to increase the company's capital, the
loans will be considered a contribution to the company's equity
capital. 62 Consequently, in insolvency proceedings, the equity
holder is not entitled, along with other creditors, to a pro rata
63
share of the assets available to satisfy all creditors' claims.

59. See Franz Schnauder & Bernd Miuller-Christmann, Durchblick: Der zivilrechtliche
Schutz des GmbH-Vermogens vor dem Zugriff der Gesellschafter, 38 JURISTISCHE
SCHULUNG [JuS] 980, 980 (1998) (explaining how the evaluation of repayment to equity
holders differs under corporate and criminal law).
60.

KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140.

61. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308-309 (1939) (discussing circumstances
wherein the claims of a corporate officer, director, or shareholder may be subordinated to
equity, including, for example, where there is a history of mismanagement; where an
interested shareholder or director's vote brought the claim into being; and where the
dominant shareholder disregarded the substance or form of corporate management,
treating the corporation's affairs as his or her own). See also KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra
note 2, at 218 (noting that a court "will sometimes subordinate the shareholder/creditor to
other creditors if it finds that the corporation was too 'thinly capitalized'....").
62. The determinative test is as follows: would a third party, (e.g., a bank), have
extended a loan with normal credit terms to the company under the circumstances? In
other words, the relevant standard is the company's creditworthiness or credit rating. See
BGHZ 76, 326 (329) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 81, 252 (263) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 90, 381 (390)
(F.R.G.).
63. After some striking criticism of those rules, two important amendments to
GmbHG section 32(a) were enacted in 1998: First, according to GmbHG section 32(a),
paragraph 3, as amended by Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz (KapAEG), v.
20.4.1998 (BGB. I S.70) (F.R.G.), small non-managing investors holding an amount of
equity in the firm of 10% or less are exempt from the rules pertaining to equity holders'
loans substituting equity capital. Second, GmbHG section 32(a) is not applicable to a
lender who acquires equity in a firm in distress in order to overcome such crisis. See §
32(a) Abs. 3 GmbHG (Sanierungsprivileg; Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im
Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG), v. 27.4.1998 (BGBI. I S.786) (F.R.G.)); BGHZ 81, 311
(311) (F.R.G.) (Sonnenring is the landmark case on the former law). It is foreseeable that
these rules will not smooth out all the existing problems. See also Robin Dorrie, Das
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Rather, the equity holder's claim is subordinated to the other
creditors' claims. 64 The equity holder's credit is only repaid if
there are assets left over after other creditors' claims are satisfied
and discharged. 6 5 By the same token, loans equity holders extend
at an earlier stage are deemed equity if they are not reclaimed,
despite the corporation's subsequent financial crisis. 66 To prevent
equity holders from circumventing this statutory approach,
GmbHG section 3267 extends the scope of the provision to include
the collateral equity holders provide to secure third party loans
and other legal acts, which, in economic terms, equal a loan
extension. 68 In recent years, transfer of the right to use a fixed
asset (Nutzungsiiberlassung)from an equity holder to a company
has increasingly been considered equivalent to the extension of a
69
loan.
The subordination of debt is not sufficient if the loan has been
repaid. A supporting protection renders two sets of rules. First,

Sanierungsprivilegdes § 32a Abs. 3 GmbHG, 20 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZIP] 20, 33 (1999); Rudolf Neuhof, Sanierungsrisken der Banken: Die VorSanierungsphase, 51 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3225, 3232 (1998). It is
doubtful that the rules will resolve the existing problems, although the jungle of law
governing "capital-replacing" loans (Eigenkapitalersatzrecht)has been cleared remarkably
to give priority to reorganization instead of dissolution; see Heribert Hirte, Aktuelle
Schwerpunkte im Kapitalersatzrecht, in GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 145, 155 (Peter
Hommelhoff & Volker ROhricht eds., 1997).
64. See § 39 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 InsO (F.R.G.) (Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordnung), v.
5.10.1994, (BGBI. I S. 2866) (effective Jan. 1, 1999) (F.R.G.)). According to the former
law, an equity holder could not claim repayment of his or her loan during bankruptcy or
composition proceedings. See § 39 Abs. 1 Nr. 5 InsO (F.R.G.). The inclusion of equity
holders in insolvency proceedings neither improves their economic position (usually, there
are no assets left after the satisfaction of prior-ranking creditors) nor tackles the pillars of
the law governing capital-replacing loans. Rather, the amendment is a technical one. See
Ulrich Noack, Neues Insolvenzrecht-neues Kapitalersatzrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT
CLAUSSEN 307, 309, 318 (1997). See also ULRICH NOACK, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 85
(1999).

65. See § 32(a) Abs.1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
66. See, e.g., BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-Rechtsprechungs-Report [NJWRR], 2 (1987), 806 (F.R.G.). The applicable test, however, is the subject of dispute. See
SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 37.IV.2.b.
67. See § 32(a) Abs. 2-3 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
68. See id. As a legal consequence, in insolvency proceedings, a third party creditor
may only claim repayment of the amount of money he or she could not collect from the
equity holder who provided the collateral.
69. See BGHZ 127, 1 (7) (F.R.G.); OLG Karlsruhe [trial court for selected criminal
matters and court of appeals], Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 17 (1996), 918 (921)
(F.R.G.). See also Holger Altmeppen, Zur "finanzplanm'fligenNutzungsiiberlassung"als
Kapitalersatz,17 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 909 (1996).
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the receiver can rescind any repayment or release of collateral
granted by an equity holder for a third party loan, provided that
the loan is repaid to the equity holder during the year preceding
the date of an insolvency petition filing.70 Second, strict protection
is achieved through the body of case law analogizing to the rules
dealing with maintenance of the company's capital. 71 Under these
rules, the company shall make no payments to an equity holder if
72
the assets covering the legal capital are thereby decreased.
Because under the above-described circumstances equity holders'
loans are deemed equity capital, they shall not be repaid until after
the financial crisis is overcome. Note that this restriction is
applicable at all times-not only when insolvency proceedings are
initiated. 73
2. Outlook
The above described situation may give rise to a firstimpression assessment of how narrow the scope of piercing the
corporate veil, in fact, need be. Because there is an entire body of
law protecting the orderly financing of limited liability companies,
piercing should remain a last resort option in cases wherein the
statutory protection of legal capital is rendered defunct.
Conversely, the concept of "abstract" legal capital does not
demand a specific amount of guaranteed capital tailored to the
individual course of the company's business. The traditional
approach, therefore, secures a stated amount of capital that may
be insufficient to meet creditors' needs as generated by the actual
size of the firm's business.74 As long as the value of the company's
assets exceed its legal capital, the equity holders appear free to
extract any capital surplus from the company. 75 Neither statutory
nor case law provide efficient protection against selfish equity
holders' removal of capital above the surplus, even though such
removal may contribute to, or even trigger, a financial crisis for the
70. See § 135 Nr. 2 InsO (F.R.G.). See also § 6 AnfG (F.R.G.) (Anfechtungsgesetz
(Avoidance Act), v. 5.10.1994 (BGB1. I S. 2911) (F.R.G.)).
71. See § 30-31 GmbHG (F.R.G.). This analogy remains valid even after the
introduction of GmbHG section 32(a). Cf. BGHZ 90, 370 (376) (F.R.G.). See HARTWIN
V. GERKAN & PETER HOMMELHOFF, KAPITALERSATZ IM GESELLSCHAFTS-UND
INSOLVENZRECHT 46 (3d ed. 1994).
72. See §8 30-31 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
73. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 37.IV.4.
74. See supra Part II.B (discussing the traditional approach).
75. See § 30 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
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company. 76 The increasing number of insolvency proceedings
raises the question of whether additional protection is achievable.
III. PERMISSIBILITY OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL BY WAY
OF AN EXCEPTION

Against this background, the underlying corporate principles
of "legal entity" 77 and "separation of funds," 7 8 if taken seriously,
are not easily overruled. In several landmark cases, the German
Supreme Court reiterated that "the concept of the company as a
separate legal entity should not be disregarded thoughtlessly or
unrestrainedly." 79 The Court, however, relied on a case-by-case
analysis, based on the notion of "misuse of the corporate form"
and carved out doctrinal grounds for piercing the corporate veil. It
is therefore necessary to evaluate possible explanations legal
authors offer and sort out fact patterns that, although seemingly
related, are not covered by this notion.
A. The Modern DoctrinalConcept
As stated above, German courts have not developed a specific
test for piercing the corporate veil. Because of definitional
problems, the German Supreme Court accords a measure of
deference to the corporate entity, which is apparently relaxed only
in "extreme" instances. 80 The Court resorts to a somewhat fluid
analysis that endeavors to take into account the totality of the
81
circumstances.
Doctrinal concepts referring to misuse of the corporate form,
either from a subjective 82 or from an objective 83 perspective
(subjektive und objektive Mif3brauchstheorien), have proven
overinclusive.
It suffices to note that the current common

76. See Schnauder & Muller-Christmann, supra note 59, at 982.
77. See supra Part II.A (discussing the "legal entity" principle).
78. See id. (discussing the "separation of funds" principle).
79. BGHZ 20, 4 (11) (F.R.G.). Accord BGHZ 31,258 (271) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 45, 204
(207) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 54, 222 (224) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 61,380 (383) (F.R.G.).
80. See BGHZ 20, 4 (11) (F.R.G.).
81. See ROWEDDER, supra note 9, § 13 cmt. 22. See also HACHENBURG, GMBHG,
app. § 13 cmt. 42 (Peter Ulmer ed., 8th ed. 1994) [hereinafter HACHENBURG, GMBHG];
SCHOLz, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG, supra note 12, § 13 cmt. 77 (Volker Emmerich ed.).
82. See generally ROLF SERICK, RECHTSFORM UND REALITAT JURISTISCHER
PERSONEN (1955) (discussing misuse of the corporate form from a subjective perspective).
83. See
Rudolf
Reinhardt,
Gedanken zum
Identitatsproblem bei
der
Einmanngesellschaft,in II FESTSCHRIFT LEHMANN 576 (1956).
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underpinnings of the piercing doctrine approach the problem
differently. They deem piercing a problem of proper construction
and application of statutes, and thus focus on the applicable
statute's legislative purpose (Normanwendungskonzept) to
determine whether the separation between the equity holders and
the corporation prevails. 84 Although the idea of misusing the
corporate form is not completely dispensable, at least in the sense
of voiding mandatory financing principles, the modem approach
makes an important difference. In particular, the notion of
disregarding the corporate form is a misnomer. At all times, the
corporation remains a legal entity with all its rights and duties,
some of which may also attach to equity holders at the same time.
B. Related PiercingProblems
In addition to this somewhat gloomy impression, there is also
remarkable uncertainty over the factual situations governing when
piercing of the corporate entity should apply. A number of court
decisions refer to the piercing doctrine, but there are almost
always other, albeit related, solutions to the legal problems at
hand. As a doctrinal matter, this changes the situation. Deference
to the concept of legal entity is of paramount importance and it
may be achieved only if lawyers diligently seek solutions that do
not "disregard" the corporate form in critical cases.
1. Separate Grounds of Obligation
At the outset, there is clearly no piercing of the corporate veil
when equity holders are liable on separate grounds. For example,
in certain circumstances, an equity holder may be liable based on a
contract of guaranty (Burgschaf),85 indemnity (Vertrag iiber
Schadloshaltung), a collateral promise (Schuldbeitritt), or a letter
of support (Patronatserklarung). As for debts, equity holders'
limited liability "must often be sacrificed. ' 86 Almost without fail,
a bank or other lender will not extend credit to a limited liability

84. See HACHENBURG, GMBHG, supra note 81, app. § 13 cmts. 28, 36. See also
Wolfram Muller-Freienfels, Zur Lehre vom sogenannten "Durchgriff" bei juristischen
Personen im Privatrecht,156 ARCHIV FUR DIE C1VILISTISCHE PRAXIS [ACP] 522 (1957);
Eckard Rehbinder, Zehn Jahre Rechtsprechung zum Durchgriff im Gesellschafisrecht,in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR ROBERT FISCHER 579, 579 (1979).
85. "Biirgschaft" is a "surety" or "bond."
BARNES & NOBLE, GERMAN
DICTIONARY 236 (1982).
86. KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 139.
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company unless the company's principal equity holders "add their
personal guarantees to the obligation .
"..."87
"Suppliers also
frequently require personal guarantees," 88 thus demonstrating that
"the significance of limited liability [in close corporations] is often
overrated." 89
Although less evident than in the above-mentioned
circumstances, piercing the corporate veil does not occur when the
equity holder's liability is based on culpa in contrahendo.90 Under
this doctrine, a (managing) self-interested equity holder leading
contract negotiations, who has a significant economic interest in
closing a certain transaction, (wirtschaftliches Eigeninteresse),91 or
who makes express representations (i.e., draws on a special
personal trust relationship) inducing the contracting party's
additional firm reliance (besonderespersOnliches Vertrauen) on the
correctness of his or92her statements, may subject the equity holder
to personal liability.
A managing equity holder who does not disclose to the
contracting party that he or she acts on a limited liability
company's behalf gives the impression that he or she will be a
party to the contract. Thus, he or she may be personally liable for
the contractual obligation-for the ostensible existence of a legal

87. Id. See BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 49 (1996), 2156 (F.R.G.);
BGH, Betriebs-Berater [BB], 53 (1998), 1175 (1175) (F.R.G.) (holding against
applicability of the Consumer Credit Act (Verbraucherkreditgesetz), v. 17.12.1990, BGB1.
I S. 2840) (F.R.G.)). For a discussion of this legal issue, see Barbara Grunewald,
BUrgschaft und Schuldbeitritt von Geschiftsfiihrern und Gesellschaftern, in FESTSCHRIFT
KRAFr 127 (1998).
88. KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140.

89. Id. at 139.
90. Under the culpa in contrahendo doctrine, contractual negotiations, even those
that do not culminate in the closing of a deal, give rise to a relationship of trust between
the parties similar to that arising from a contract requiring parties observe the ordinary
standard of care. See OTHMAR JAUERNIG & MAX VOLLKOMMER, BUDRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 276 cmts. 69-73 (8th ed. 1997).
91. Today, it is beyond debate that having a major equity holding in a company does
not constitute a significant economic interest. Otherwise the privilege of limited liability,
as provided in GmbHG section 13, paragraph 2, would be senseless. The German
Supreme Court, however, has not always been that clear in this respect and now requires
"additional facts." BGHZ 126, 181 (184, 186) (F.R.G.). Granting a personal guarantee to
certain creditors does not meet this standard.
See id.
See also BGH,
Wertpapiermitteilungen [WM],
51/52 (1988), 1873 (1874)
(F.R.G.); BGH,
Wertpapiermitteilungen [WM], 45 (1985), 1526 (1528) (F.R.G.); OLG K6ln, GmbHRundschau [GMBHR], 87 (1996), 766 (767) (F.R.G.).
92. See BGH, Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 11 (1990), 659 (661) (F.R.G.).
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situation (Vertrauenshaftung)93 because the other party dealt with
the individual as if he or she was the sole proprietor, and thus
expected recourse in the individual's assets. A similar fact pattern,
"mixing of corporate spheres" (Spharenvermischung),94 occurs
when two or more limited liability companies, whose identities and
functions are easily confused, perform their businesses with exactly
the same staff, business address (shared buildings), and almost the
same equity holders and managers. Moreover, their fields of
business often overlap or supplement each other. The close
physical proximity of these companies, often combined with
similar firm names, makes it nearly impossible for outsiders to
determine the contracting party's identity. 95 Although at first
blush this fact pattern may call for piercing, it is imperative to
recognize that as long as there is no commingling of funds,
reasonable solutions are achievable with the general contract and
commercial law doctrines, namely the duty to disclose the
identities
of
the
principal
and
the
agent
(Offenkundigkeitsprinzip).96
Separation of funds does not
97
safeguard affiliated companies that breach this duty.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that equity holders could
also be personally liable in tort.98 According to the German Civil
Code (BiirgerlichesGesetzbuch (BGB)) section 826, a person who
willfully causes damage to another in a manner contrary to public
policy is bound to compensate the other for the damage. 99 Thus, a
majority equity holder may be held liable, pursuant to this section,
if he or she intentionally "undercapitalizes" the company to the
93. See BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 43 (1990), 2679 (2679)
(F.R.G.).
94. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 9.IV.2. See also Lutter, supra note 20, at 283, cmt.
F 69.
95. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 9.IV.2.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See §§ 31, 823, 826, 831 BGB (F.R.G.). For example, managing equity holders
who postpone filing for insolvency are liable in tort. See § 823 Abs. 2 BGB (F.R.G.); § 64
GmbHG (F.R.G.). See also BGHZ 126, 181 (190) (F.R.G.). According to this new
German Supreme Court precedent, (BGHZ 126, 181 (193) (F.R.G.)), creditors who
entered into a contract after the corporation is insolvent will be fully compensated under
BGB section 823, paragraph 2; while in former decisions (e.g., BGHZ 29, 100 (107)
(F.R.G.); BGHZ 100, 19 (32) (F.R.G.)), creditors were only compensated for damage to
their dividends in insolvency (Quotenschaden). Thus, "piercing the corporate veil" today
seems less imperative in cases of material undercapitalization. See ROTH & ALTMEPPEN,
supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 23.
99. See § 826 BGB (F.R.G.).
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detriment of creditors (Glaubigerschadigung).10 0 Initially, finding
liability under BGB section 826 was rare, 10 1 but now tort law has
become important for equity holder liability by expanding the
scope of section 826.102 In many cases, courts have relied on torts,
rather than on piercing the corporate veil, to find liability. 10 3
Hence, section 826 has been interpreted less subjectively than the
statute's language seems to allow. 10 4 The German Supreme
Court's reading of "intention" appears rather liberal. The Court's
interpretation only requires a finding that the probability of
damage was perfectly obvious to the equity holder given his or her
previous knowledge. 10 5 Because corporate managers are required
to inform equity holders when an urgent need for capital arises, 10 6
BGB section 826 appears to be a reliable check on the company's
capitalization.
2. Construction of Contracts and Statutes
The proper handling of contractual and statutory duties and
liabilities often requires consideration of the fact that the legal
entity (to which rights and duties may attach) and its equity
holders stand side-by-side. For example, 10 7 a limited liability
company, as an equity holder in a limited liability partnership
(Kommanditgesellschaft), may be subject to a restraint-of-trade
clause. 10 8 To hold that this clause binds not only the limited
liability company, but also its major equity holder, a court does not
refer to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Rather, the

100. See BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 32 (1979), 2104 (2105)
(F.R.G.). See also Rudolf Nirk, Zur Rechtsfolgenseite der Durchgriffshaftung, in
FESTSCHRIFr STIMPEL 443, 451 (1985).
101. See Ulrich Ehricke, Zur Begrundbarkeit der Durchgriffshaftung in der GmbH,
insbesondere aus methodischer Sicht, 199 ARCHIV FUR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [ACP]

257, 278 (1999).
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 32 (1979), at 2105.
104.

See generally ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 43 cmt. 32.

105. See BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJWJ, 32 (1979), at 2105.
106.

See generally SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG, supra note 12, § 43 cmt. 37a

(Uwe H. Schneider ed.).
107. See BGHZ 89, 162 (162) (F.R.G.).
108. See § 112 Abs. 1 HGB (F.R.G.) (Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) v. 10.5.1897, (RGBI.
S. 219) (F.R.G.), amended by Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) v. 25.6.1998, (BGB1. I. S. 1588)

(F.R.G.) (providing, in pertinent part: "A partner may not, without the consent of the
other partners, conduct business in the partnership's branch of business or participate as a
general partner in another similar commercial partnership.")).
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equity holder is restrained as a result of the corporate contract.
Additionally, the clause also binds the equity holder as a matter of
duty and loyalty to the company.
The context of applying statutes requires similar construction.
For example, the German Supreme Court held that in insolvency
proceedings, 10 9 close relatives of a limited liability company's
equity holders are deemed close relatives of the company. Again,
the Court's holding was not founded on the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil, but on general rules of statutory
1 10
construction.
C. CharacteristicCases of PiercingLiability
Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law,
under which investors in a corporation are not liable for more than
the amount they invest. As a result, limited liability shifts some of
the risk of a business' failure to creditors. 111 Hence, liability has
never been absolutely limited. Courts occasionally allow creditors
to "pierce the corporate veil," which means that equity holders
must satisfy creditors' claims. 1 12 Generally, "equity holders are in
danger of personal liability for the debts of a corporation if they
use the corporation for fraudulent purposes or if they.., disregard
the separation of funds." 113 Under German law, three different
fact patterns dominate this context, namely, commingling of funds,
114
gross undercapitalization, and parent-subsidiary combinations.
Many cases involve combinations of these factual circumstances;
these combinations add to the heterogeneity of the legal
prerequisites and solutions.
1. Commingling of Corporate and Personal Funds
A seemingly palpable ground for the necessity of piercing the
corporate veil is the commingling of corporate and personal funds
or assets. 115 As a matter of law, it is unacceptable for an equity

109. See BGHZ 58, 20 (20) (F.R.G.).
110. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 9.111.2.
111. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
See also EASTERBROOK &
112. See id. (presenting an American perspective).
FISCHEL, supra note 24, at 54.
113. KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140.

114. See discussion infra Parts III.C.1-3 (discussing the three different fact patterns).
115.

See

Walter

Stimpel,

"Durchsgriffshaftung" bei der

GmbH:

Tatbestande,
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holder to blatantly commingle funds. The equity holder only
benefits from limited liability if he or she adheres to the law.
The German Supreme Court left open the question whether
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should apply in all
commingling cases. 1 16
Due to the reluctance to open the
floodgates to a generalized doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,
two sets of cases are distinguished.
First, where the commingling of funds is reduced to certain
(individual) assets, the extension of liability bears on these assets
only. 117 This does not require piercing or even disregarding the
corporate form for creditors' benefit. Rather, a straightforward
application of civil law rules1 18 and GmbHG section 13 suffices.
Conversely, within the narrow scope of piercing liability, cases
lie wherein the shuffling of funds in and out of the company is so
extreme that the removed assets cannot be individualized. Here,
the separation of corporate and private funds is covered up or the
assets are made impossible to reach by means of "opaque"
bookkeeping methods or other devices. Thus, the rules governing
maintenance of corporate capital described above cannot develop
any protective or preventive effect. 1 19 Under these circumstances,
equity holders may be held personally liable. 120 According to the
underlying doctrinal concept described earlier, 12 1 such piercing
liability is not a structural or an institutional liability applying to all
equity holders in the same manner regardless of their individual
22
responsibility, it is a liability for fault (Verschuldenshaftung).
Accordingly, only a principal equity holder with influence over
12 3
corporate affairs may be held liable.

Verlustausgleich,Ausfallhaftung, in FESTSCHRIFr GOERDELER 601, 606 (1987).
116. See BGH, Betriebs-Berater [BB], 40 (1985), 77(F.R.G.).
117. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 9.IV.2.a.
118. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the civil law rules).
119. See BGHZ 125,366 (368) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 95,330 (333) (Autokran) (F.R.G.).
120. See id. See also Ehricke, supra note 101, at 292-299.
121. See discussion, supra Part III.A.
122. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 9.IV.2.a.
123. See BGHZ 125, 366 (366) (F.R.G.) (holding that a scarecrow, "dummy,"
managing shareholder may not be held liable).
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2. Gross Undercapitalization
Another reason for piercing the corporate veil occurs when
equity holders "knowingly 'undercapitalized' the corporation at its
formation [or at a later point,] so that it could not pay its
foreseeable debts." 124 So far, "no decision appears yet to have
clearly held [equity holders] liable based solely upon a finding of
gross undercapitalization." 125 Courts refer to liability in tort,
the intent to
pursuant to BGB section 826,126 in cases where
127
damage creditors is clear from the circumstances.
Because the concept of stated capital 28 is an abstract one that
does not guarantee capital sufficient to the individual pursuit of
business, there must be some kind of safeguard. During the course
of the last major amendment of the GmbHG in 1980, however, a
provision requiring capitalization sufficient for a company's
intended business transactions was rejected. 129 It was deemed
impossible to permanently determine, with legal accuracy, a
corporation's adequate capitalization, as measured by the
individual corporate undertaking and its magnitude. 130 Moreover,
liability based on a rather vague ex post assessment of adequate
capitalization is inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty
and questions the concept of limited liability itself.131 Hence, the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should not reintroduce this
appropriately rejected concept to serve as a catchall for cases that
cannot be resolved through application of the maintenance of
capital rule.
As indicated above, equity holders are personally liable only
in extreme cases when they are knowingly involved in a scheme

124. KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140.
125. Id. See also BGHZ 68, 312, (316) (F.R.G); Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [supreme
labor court], Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht [ZIP], 20 (1999), 878 (879) (F.R.G.) (holding
against shareholder liability because of undercapitalization); Boujong, supra note 17, at
745; KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140 (noting that undercapitalization is a "more
uncertain basis for 'piercing the corporate veil"').
126. § 826 BGB (F.R.G.). See also supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the fact that the
corporate veil will not be pierced when equity holders are held liable on separate
grounds).
127. See supra Part III.B.1.

128. See § 5 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
129. See Ehricke, supra note 101, at 284.

130. See Stimpel, supra note 115, at 608.
131. See Deutscher Bundestag [German Parliament] [BT] No. 1347, 38th Sess., at 38
(1977) (F.R.G.). See also Stimpel, supra note 115, at 608.
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leaving the company exposed to business risk without sufficient
capital to pay its debts. 132 In other words, equity holders are liable
when they completely ignore the company's need for additional
equity capital, allowing it to become grossly undercapitalized
(materielle Unterkapitalisierung).133 Again, piercing liability does
not apply to all equity holders in the same manner regardless of
their individual responsibility. 134 Only principal equity holders
with influence over the management of corporate affairs are held
liable.
3. Parent-Subsidiary Combinations
Under German law, one corporation's control over another (a
parent-subsidiary combination) is not a sufficient ground for
piercing the corporate veil. 135 Each corporation remains a
separate entity even in a closely linked group of affiliated
corporations. 136 The parent is not treated as a component of a
"larger enterprise" and is not usually held liable for the debts of its
37
subsidiaries or siblings (as with brother and sister corporations).
This seems to be the general view in all of the European Union
member states and in the United States, 138 where the principle of

132. See KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 140. See also Ehricke, supra note 101,
at 280.
133. In cases wherein equity holders extend loans to the company, rather than
contributing equity capital, thus triggering nominal undercapitalization (nominelle
Unterkapitalisierung),the loans are deemed equal with equity capital contingent on a
finding of the prerequisites provided in GmbHG section 32(a).
134. But see LUTTER & HOMMELHOFF, supra note 31, § 13 cmt. 12 (explaining the
minority view).
135. See BGHZ 81, 311 (317) (F.R.G.); Lutter, supra note 20, at 253, cmt. F 12. Cf.
TIMO RAPAKKO, UNLIMITED SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY IN MULTINATIONALS (1997)

(presenting an international analysis).
136. See Reinhard Bork, Zurechnung im Konzern, 23 ZEITSCHRIF" FOR
UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 237, 243 (1994).
137. See, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 420-421 (1966) (refusing to pierce
the corporate veil and hold personally liable the owner of a taxi business that was
fragmented into ten corporations, each of which had only two cabs registered in its name
and all of which "operated as a single entity with regard to financing, supplies, repairs,
employees and garaging."). See also KLEIN & COFFEE JR., supra note 2, at 141 n.29
(noting that under the enterprise liability theory, "each of the fragments of the single
enterprise are held liable, but the court does not hold the ultimate shareholder liable.").
138. For discussions of U.S. and European Union law see generally KONZERNRECHT
IM AUSLAND (Marcus Lutter ed., 1994). See also DAS GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT DER
KONZERNE IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH (Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker & Peter

Behrens eds., 1991); Miller, supra note 3, at 84; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). But see generally
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separation of funds
bars general liability for an affiliated
139
company's debts.
On the other hand, a parent corporation may be involved in
one of the schemes described above. Control may result in
commingling of funds and material undercapitalization of the
subsidiary (konzernbedingte VermOgensaushohlung). Piercing the
corporate veil may be allowed where a parent corporation
completely strips the subsidiary of its assets thereby rendering the
subsidiary insolvent to the prejudice of creditors, or where the
parent company intentionally schemes to squirrel assets into a
liability-free sub-corporation while heaping liabilities upon an
140
asset-free sub-corporation.
German court dockets, however, are nearly devoid of these
types of piercing cases 141 because the large body of German law
governing affiliated companies (Konzernrecht) endeavors to
protect creditors and shareholders against typical dangers, such as
unfair inter-corporate transactions. 142 To be sure, such unfair
transactions between a corporation and its controlling equity
holder are possible even when individuals control the corporation.
These transactions are much more likely to occur, however, when
another corporation holds control. 143 That being so, in Germany,
it is imperative that specific laws provide for the taming of
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 343 (1947)
(discussing affiliated groups of companies and the alternative theory of "enterprise
entity").
139. See Miller, supra note 3, at 84.
140. Such a scheme, wherein one company bears all the risk, while its sibling (sister
company) earns all the profit, is often referred to as Institutsmil3brauch. See BGH,
Wertpapiermitteilungen [WM], 33 (1979), 229 (230) (F.R.G.) (finding shareholder liability
pursuant to § 826 BGB (F.R.G.)). See also Marcus Lutter, Die zivilrechtliche Haftung in
der
Unternehmensgruppe, 11
ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR
UNTERNEHMENS-UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 244, 252 (1982).
141. See Ehricke, supra note 101, at 265.
142. See Maximilian Schiel31, The Liability of Corporations and Shareholders for the
Capitalization and Obligations of Subsidiaries under German Law, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 480, 496 (1986). Except for Germany and Portugal, the European Union (E.U.)
member states do not have special provisions for corporate groups. See Konzernrecht ftr
Europa-Forum Europaeum Konzernrecht, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENSUND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 674 (1998). They do not doubt the inherent risks,
but rather, try to reach flexible solutions through modifying the general corporate and
insolvency laws. See id. The German model served as an example for proposed E.U.
Directives, but lately, seems to be of shrinking importance within the European Union.
See Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate Law in the European Union, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 377, 391 (1998); Miller, supra note 3, at 124.
143. See ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 2.
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corporations
or
individual
shareholders-either
majority
entrepreneurs-who have significant business interests outside the
Consequently, statutory provisions 145 govern
corporation. 144
affiliated enterprises incorporated under the Stock Corporation
Act (Aktiengesetz (AktG)). 14 6 The law of affiliated limited
liability companies, however, has been carved out only by court
decisions, many of which further developed dominating
shareholders' fiduciary duties (Treuepflichten) or applied the
147
AktG statutes mutatis mutandis.
In general, a Konzern is created when one or more companies
Majority
are subject to the uniform direction of another. 148
ownership triggers a rebuttable presumption of control 14 9 and the
existence of a Konzern.150 Under the AktG, upon consent of the
equity holders of both companies, the parent and subsidiary may
1 51
enter into a domination agreement (Beherrschungsvertrag)
giving the parent company the right to instruct the subsidiary's
management (a contractual Konzern (Vertragskonzern)).15 2 The
subsidiary's officers and directors are obliged to follow these
1 53
instructions even if doing so is detrimental to the subsidiary.
Frequently, due to tax benefits, domination agreements are
agreements
profit
transfer
combined
with
15 4 As a result, a parent company may
(Gewinnabfihrungsvertrag).
exploit the subsidiary. To protect the subsidiary's creditors and
shareholders, the parent company must compensate for any annual
1 55
loss the subsidiary incurs during the term of the agreement.

144. See id.
145. See §§ 15,291 AktG (F.R.G.).
146. See Aktiengesetz (AktG), v. 6.9.1965 (BGB1. I S.1089) (F.R.G.), amended by
Aktiengesetz (AktG), v. 16.7.1998 (BGB1 I S.1842) (F.R.G.).
147. Due to the lack of specific statutory law pertaining to liability within corporate
groups in the United States, scholars generally view cases involving affiliated companies as
a subcategory of piercing the corporate veil. See Schiefl, supra note 142, at 482.
Conversely, for a proper understanding of German law pertaining to Konzern it is
imperative to recognize that it is not linked to the piercing doctrine.
148. See § 18 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
149. See § 17 Abs. 2 AktG (F.R.G.).
150. See § 18 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
151. See § 291 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
152. § 308 Abs:1 AktG (F.R.G.).
153. See § 308 Abs. 1-2 AktG (F.R.G.) (requiring that the instructions serve the

interest of the parent company or of another affiliated company).
154. "The profit transfer agreement requires one enterprise to transfer its entire profits
to the other." § 291 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
155. See § 302 AktG (F.R.G.).
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Note that this liability is strictly internal,156 is not contingent upon
proof of a causal nexus between control and157damage, and is not
limited to the protection of the stated capital.
Of course, a parent may exert influence over its subsidiary
158
without a domination agreement, in which case uniform control
is based on the parent's dominant position as principal shareholder
(de facto Konzern). 159 The parent corporation may not induce a
subsidiary to enter into detrimental legal transactions unless it
compensates the subsidiary for such disadvantage. 160 Should the
parent company neither compensate a subsidiary until the end of
the fiscal year nor grant a legal claim to its subsidiary, the parent is
liable to the subsidiary for any resulting damage. 161 Again, such
liability is internal, although creditors and shareholders function as
"watchdogs," in that they have standing to assert the subsidiary's
damage claim against the parent to the extent they are unable to
receive satisfaction from the subsidiary. 162 Uniform direction in
the absence of a domination agreement is often the case with
affiliated limited liability companies because a parent, as an equity
holder, has the right to instruct the affiliate's managing directors in
all company affairs. 163 The majority view does not draw an
analogy to the concepts of the AktG, 164 but rather, holds that the
proper basis for the internal liability for damages is a parent
corporation's violation of the duty of loyalty (Einzelhaftung wegen
Treupflichtverletzung).165

156. See Bork, supra note 136, at 259. If a domination agreement is terminated, the
controlling party must provide security to the controlled company's creditors whose claims
arose prior to the date on which the registration of the termination is published in the
commercial register. See § 303 Abs. 1 AtkG (F.R.G.). In lieu of providing security, the
controlling party may provide a guarantee to the creditors. See id.
157. See § 302 AktG (F.R.G.).
158. See § 18 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
159. See ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 91.
160. See § 311 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
161. See § 317 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
162. See id.
163. See § 45 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
164. See BGHZ 95, 330 (340) (Autokran) (F.R.G.); Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Der
faktische GmbH-Konzern, in FESTSCHRIFT 100 JAHRE GMBHG 657, 665, 695 (1992).
165. See BGHZ 65, 15 (15) (ITT) (F.R.G.); Wolfgang Zollner, BAUMBACH & HUECK,
GMBHG, app. KONZERNRECHT cmt. 53 (16th ed. 1996); HACHENBURG, GMBHG, supra
note 81, app. § 77 cmt. 56; SCHOLZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG, supra note 12, app.
Konzernrecht cmt. 181 (Volker Emmerich ed.). But see HOLGER ALTMEPPEN, DIE
HAFTUNG DES MANAGERS IM KONZERN 80 (1998).
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In practice, the statutory concept of controlled and balanced
safeguards inside the de facto Konzern may not work in certain
circumstances. When a parent corporation controls and operates
its subsidiary, denying it any direction of its own, and refuses to
allow it any opportunity to make an arm's length profit, a court
may rely on the notion of "material or qualified control" to justify
holding the parent company liable to the subsidiary (qualified de
facto Konzern (qualifiziert-faktischerKonzern)). 166 At a certain
level of domination and integration, it becomes virtually
impossible to isolate the detrimental transactions (instructions)
and their nexus to losses, to assess the damages, or to identify
violations of the duty of loyalty. Here, under the specific
circumstances described below, a parent company must
compensate for any loss by the subsidiary analogous to AktG
section 302.167
The concept of internal liability for a subsidiary's loss either
based on the parent's violation of the duty of loyalty to the
subsidiary, or on loss compensation (regardless of fault), was
rendered "opaque" in the Autokran case, which was the first to
deal with a "qualified de facto Konzern." 168 In Autokran, a single
business was fragmented into different corporations, all of which
were owned by the same shareholder. 169 The shareholder
organized his enterprise as seven separate limited liability
companies, each of which entered into thirty-nine leasing
contracts. Upon the limited liability companies' default, the lessor
obtained judgments for lease payments, but was able to collect
only a relatively small sum compared to the total amounts due
under the contracts. 170 The apparent objective was to ensure
further fragmentation of contractual liability. 171 The German
Supreme Court held the controlling shareholder directly liable to
the creditors for claims exceeding the subsidiaries' assets, pursuant
to an analogous application of AktG sections 303 and 322.172
Thus, the Court shifted from internal to external liability. An

166. See ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 117. See also Assmann, supra
note 164, at 657, 665, 695.
167.

See ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 117.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

BGHZ 95,330 (330) (F.R.G.).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 341-342.
See id. (applying §§ 303 Abs. 1, 322 Abs. 2-3 AktG (F.R.G.)).
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analysis of the Court's reasoning also reveals that it "mixed" the
concept of loss compensation regardless of fault, as developed for
Konzern cases, together with the ultimate shareholder's liability,
as manager of all of the companies, for faulty management, which
173
is also applicable to an independent limited liability company.
This mixing of different concepts provided no obvious benefit.
174
Consequently, the Court altered its position in a later decision.
The position of the Court today, however, appears to embrace
"modified liability for conduct" (regardless of fault) rather than
"liability for a certain structure of the corporate group.' ' 1 75 In a
consistent line of cases beginning with the TBB case, 17 6 the Court
clarified that it is not, as may be concluded from earlier decisions,
the density of direction that triggers liability in a qualified de facto
Konzern, but rather, the 'objective misuse' of the parent's power
of direction (objektiver Mif3brauch der Konzernleitungsmacht).17 7
According to the Court, such "objective misuse" is evident in a
situation wherein a parent company exerts its power to direct a
subsidiary in a way that does not evince reasonable consideration
for the subsidiary's corporate interest thereby making
compensation for specific detriments virtually impossible. 17 8
Quite naturally, this rather sweeping language leaves the Court
with remarkable leeway-the Court has since not held in a
plaintiff's favor. 17 9 Hopefully, after necessary correction of the
earlier TBB rulings, the Court will not demand too high a standard
for liability.

173. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 39.111; Karsten Schmidt, Konzernhaftung oder
mitgliedschaftliche Haftung des privaten GmbH-Gesellschafters, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZIP] 146, 148
(1986); HERBERT
WIEDEMANN,
DIE
UNTERNEHMENSGRUPPE IM PRIVATRECHT 88 (1988).
174. See BGHZ 107, 7 (7) (Tiefbau) (F.R.G.).
175. BGHZ 122, 123 (123) (TBB) (F.R.G.).
176. See id. (involving a parent and its subsidiaries engaged in the construction
business; upon the parent's direction, one subsidiary collaterally promised to be liable for
repaying the credit its sibling companies obtained from a bank and conveyed all its fixed
assets and assigned its receivables to the bank for security purposes-upon default by the
subsidiary, a creditor sued the parent company). See also Uwe H. Schneider, Neues zum
qualifizierten faktischen GmbH-Konzem: Das "TBB"-Urteil-Anmerkung zu BGH WM
1993, 687-, 18 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUNGEN 782 (1993) (analyzing the TBB judgment).
177. BGHZ 122, 123 (130) (F.R.G.).
178. See id.
179. See Lutz Michalski & Finn Zeidler, Die Ausgleichshaftung im qualifiziert
faktischen Konzern-eine Analyse fur die Praxis, 39 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIF
224, 224 (1996).
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For purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that the
liability is strictly internal. 180 Creditors have standing in a lawsuit
against a controlling company only after they prove unable to
obtain satisfaction from the subsidiary. 18 1 As discussed below, it
seems equally advantageous for independent limited liability
companies to remain within a conclusive concept of internal
liability.
IV. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPT: VIOLATION OF THE DuTY OF
LOYALTY

A. Internal Liability
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a concept of last
resort, the excessive application of which causes sincere doctrinal
problems. The whole concept remains nebulous, particularly if
taken together with the concept of the corporation as a legal
entity. 1 82 Doubts multiply when pondering the legal consequence
of equity holders' direct liability to third party creditors. Courts
and legal scholars quite often do not discuss the doctrinal basis for
the latter at all. Instead explanations range from "good faith," to
analogies to the joint and several liability of partners in a general
partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaf).183 Most strikingly, all
these explanations run directly counter to the concept of indirect
creditor protection. Therefore, it must be commonly understood
that there are very few fact patterns in which equity holders' direct
external liability is attainable, if at all. In these cases, the
application of BGB section 826 (liability in tort for willful
damage 84 contrary to public policy) has priority.
With respect to the latent weakness of the rules governing
maintenance of legal capital of independent limited liability
companies, it remains a challenging task to develop a consistent
system of additional creditor protection that avoids "relativity" of
the legal entity, and, in particular, of the separation of funds.
Against this background, in this author's opinion, such protection
180. See Bork, supra note 136, at 260 (stating that there is no need for veil-piercing
tailored to Konzern cases).
181. See §§ 309 Abs. 4, 317 Abs. 1, 4, 318 Abs. 4, 323 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.). See also
SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 39.111.
182. See Ehricke, supra note 101, at 262-267.
183. See § 128 HBG (F.R.G.).
184. See § 826 BGB (F.R.G.).
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must be internal, and must safeguard a company's proper equity
capitalization exceeding the stated amount. The key to a solution
is twofold: first, recognizing a corporation's interests as distinct
from its equity holders' private interests, and second, recognizing
an equity holder's duty of loyalty, not only to fellow equity
holders, but also to the company itself.
So far, in situations involving companies with only one
shareholder, establishing a duty to finance properly, beyond the
scope of the statutory corporate finance rules, seems to be an
elusive quest because the interests of the equity holder and the
company are deemed congruent. 185 A separate "corporate
interest"
(Gesellschaftsinteresse) of one-member-companies
demanding legal protection has apparently not yet been
recognized. It is noteworthy that "separation of corporate and
private interests" and protection of the company are out of
question in co-determined limited liability companies and in
parent-subsidiary combinations. This should also be accepted for
small limited liability companies, even when they have only one
equity holder. 186 Total conformity of corporate and shareholder
interests does not agree with the concept of the company as a legal
entity distinct from its member(s)-such "corporate interest" does
not call for absolute deference. The equity holder(s) are free to
determine the corporate purposes in the by-laws 187 and may
choose to dissolve the company at any time. 188 Nevertheless, as
long as they decide to pursue their business in the form of a limited
liability company, their freedom of financial disposition should be
restricted.
There are certainly good reasons to say that such restriction at least in the context of repaying equity contributions to equity
holders-is not feasible without statutory amendment to the
Limited Liability Company Act. For example, AktG section 57189
constitutes a total ban on corporate capital payouts regardless of
the coverage of the stated capital, whereas GmbHG section 30190
does not contain such a restriction. Understandably, a stricter rule

185. See BGHZ 56, 97 (101) (F.R.G.); BGHZ 119, 257 (259) (F.R.G.).
186.

See

PETER

HOMMELHOFF,

DIE KONZERNLEITUNGSPFLICHT

Schnauder & MUller-Christmann, supra note 59, at 983.
187. See § 45 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
188. See § 60 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.); SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 37.111.7.
189. See § 57 Abs. 1 AktG (F.R.G.).
190. § 30 GmbHG (F.R.G.).

256

(1982);
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can only be implemented by statute. Yet this is only one side of
the argument, and the problem bears on the company's sufficient
capitalization in accordance with its business pursuits in general.
Under statutory corporate law as it now stands, the doctrine of the
duty of loyalty' 91 flowing from membership (mitgliedschaftliches
Sonderrechtsverhiltnis),192 may serve as a doctrinal basis for equity
insufficient
internal liability for
a company's
holders'
capitalization.
According to the aforementioned "corporate
interest," an equity holder should not only owe loyalty to his
fellow equity holders, but also to the company itself, even if he or
she is the only equity holder. 19 3 This implies that managing
members have a "financing responsibility.' ' 194
Due to the
normative function of the company's capital to balance possible
losses and prevent a fast slide into insolvency, the company's
capital should increase in accordance with the growth, nature, and
risk of its business transactions. Understandably, this does not
mean that equity holders must permanently adapt the legal capital
to the ups and downs of the corporate business in order to escape
personal liability. This would reintroduce the infeasible economic
19 5
evaluation of sufficient stated capital, as described above.
Nonetheless, there are decisive points and turnarounds in the
"life" of the company calling for change in the financial
situation 19 6 or, if this is not obtainable, liquidation of the company.
For example, equity holders may not extract assets essential for
the company's liquidity to meet its foreseeable debts 197 or take

191. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 20.IV.
192. See id.
193.

See BARBARA GRUNEWALD, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 373 (3d ed. 1999); Martin

Winter, Eigeninteresse und Treupflicht bei der Einmann-GmbH in der neueren BGHRechtsprechung, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
[ZGR] 570, 584 (1994); Schnauder & Muller-Christmann, supra note 59, at 984; HansJoachim Priester, Die eigene GmbH als fremder Dritter. Eigensphareder Gesellschaft und
Verhaltenspflichten ihrer Gesellschafter, 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS-UND
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 512, 525 (1993).
194.

ROTH & ALTMEPPEN, supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 25 (noting that a manager and a

managing member (under GmbHG § 35) may be liable to the company pursuant to
GmbHG, section 43, paragraphs 1-2 (stating that managers must, in the affairs of the
company, apply the due care of a prudent businessman if they do not conform with the
duties described below)).
195. See supra Part III.C.1.
196. See Stimpel, supra note 115, at 609.

197. See id.
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excessive business risks that cannot be hedged with the corporate
capital. 198
Put more abstractly, violations of the duties of loyalty and
care do not stem from the negligent omission to provide the
company with additional equity capital, but rather, from careless
business pursuits to the equity capital's detriment. 199 From these
duties flow the obligation to refrain from any action that visibly
endangers the corporation's existence prior to shareholder consent
Understandably, the threshold of
as to its dissolution.200
corresponding liability must be high in order to conform to the
concept of "limited liability." The determinative test could read as
follows: the extraction of capital from a corporation violates the
duty of loyalty when the capital remaining in the firm is
insufficient to the degree that, in the normal course of business,
the probability of the corporation's dissolution, to the detriment of
its creditors, evidently rises above any usual business risk.20 1 Any
intentional violation of this obligation may trigger internal liability
to the corporation. By the same token, a risky business pursuit
clearly distorting the relation to the firm's capital may also fall
under this test.
Taken together, the view proffered above is a preferable
modification and a reason to transfer external liability to an
internal concept of equity holders duties that evades the legal
problems involved with piercing the corporate veil. This view can
complete the concept of the corporate entity to not only benefit
the corporation, but more importantly, to bring about the well
balanced discharge of its creditors. 202 It remains to be seen,
however, how the discussion regarding additional internal
protection of the limited liability company's corporate capital will
develop. The majority of commentators still seem to reject the
view this Article proffers. Even though the German Supreme

198.
199.

See id.
Altmeppen, supra note 69, at 912.

200. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 37.III.7 (defining the concept as "liability for the
causation of insolvency" (Konkursverursachungshafiung)). See also Altmeppen, supra
note 69, at 912; Holger Altmeppen, Urteilsanmerkung zu BAG ZIP 1999, 878, 20

ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 881, 882 (1999); ROTH & ALTMEPPEN,
supra note 46, § 13 cmt. 24.
201. See Thomas Raiser, Konzernhaftung und Unterkapitalisierungshaftung, 24
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMEN-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 156, 165 (1995)

(articulating a similar definition in the context of material undercapitalization).
202. See GRUNEWALD, supra note 193, at 373.
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Court generally denies that a single equity holder has a duty 20of3
loyalty to "his or her" (wholly owned) limited liability company,
the Court holdings seem inconsistent. In the same decision, the
Court tackled, but did not decide, the question as to whether
corporate capital must be protected beyond the scope of GmbHG
section 30 when a transaction endangers the company's
204
existence.
B. Additional Creditor'sRights in a Lawsuit
It is very unlikely that a company's internal claims against its
equity holder(s) will be litigated, except in insolvency
proceedings. 20 5 In the latter case, the receiver will claim additional
(re)payments to the corporate funds.20 6 Notwithstanding this
seemingly protective safeguard, commencement of insolvency
proceedings is often denied because of lack of assets (for denial it
suffices that the assets will not cover the costs of the insolvency
proceedings). 20 7 Therefore, creditors need protection after the
commencement of insolvency proceedings is denied. This can be
achieved by granting a creditor secondary standing in a suit against
a company's equity holders analogous to sections of the AktG,2 °8
which allow a creditor standing to litigate a company's claim
Under normal
against its equity holders for damages. 20 9
circumstances, an affirmative judgment orders equity holders to
make payments to the company, and not to the creditors. 210 Thus,
the creditors may proceed directly against the equity holder(s)
insolvency proceedings and
after denial of the commencement of 211
dissolution.
subsequent
the company's

203. See BGHZ 122,333 (336) (F.R.G.).
204. See id. See also SCHOLz, KOMMENTAR ZUM GMBHG supra note 12, § 37 cmt. 52
(Uwe H. Schneider ed.).
205. See GERD KRIEGER, HANDBUCH KONZERNFINANZIERUNG, § 4 cmt. 4.10
(Marcus Lutter et. al. eds., 1998).
206. See § 80 Abs. 1 InsO (F.R.G.).
207. See § 26 Abs. 1 InsO (F.R.G.).
208. See, e.g., §§ 93 Abs. 5, 117 Abs. 5,309 Abs. 4, 310 Abs. 4, 317 Abs. 4, 318 Abs. 4
AktG (F.R.G.).
209. See SCHMIDT, supra note 15, § 9.IV.5.

210. In any event, the creditors may attach this claim when they levy execution on the
company's assets. See §§ 829, 835 ZPO (Civil Procedure Act (ZivilprozeBordnung) v.
12.9.1950, BGBI. S. 533)) (F.R.G.).
211. See § 60 Abs. 1 GmbHG (F.R.G.).
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V. CONCLUSION

The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil triggering equity
holders' direct external liability to creditors remains an obscure
safeguard for corporate creditors placing the concepts of legal
entity and separation of funds in danger. Therefore, the analysis
strongly suggests that veil piercing should be abolished. In
extreme cases, such as those involving the draining of funds or
intentional undercapitalization, the equity holders' liability in tort,
212
pursuant to BGB section 826, may help fill the gaps.
It is clear, however, that additional protection of the
corporate capital beyond the statutory protection of the stated
capital is of paramount importance. As discussed above, the
concept of equity holders' internal liability to the company
efficiently eliminates inequitable corporate risk allocation. Solidly
based on a violation of the duty of loyalty, it can prevent the
limited liability company's insufficient capitalization that evidently
contravenes the company's business pursuit and endangers the
company's existence. In addition, special procedural devices
furnish creditors with standing to litigate a company's claim
against its equity holders for damages.

212. See BGHZ 68,312 (315) (F.R.G.). See also Ehricke, supra note 101, at 292-297.

